TY - JOUR
T1 - Wittgenstein’s Conception of Hypotheses in Chapters XII and XXII of ‘Philosophical Remarks’ and the Function of Language
AU - Franken Figueiredo, Florian
N1 - UIDB/00183/2020
UIDP/00183/2020
PTDC/FER-FIL/29906/2017
PY - 2021
Y1 - 2021
N2 - In this paper, I explore Wittgenstein’s conception of a hypothesis as articulated in Chapters XII and XXII of ‘Philosophical Remarks’. First, I argue that in Chapter XII, Wittgenstein draws on his account of infinity to begin to challenge the view that all hypotheses can be proven by empirical evidence. I then argue that in Chapter XXII that Wittgenstein sharpens this conception of hypotheses claiming that no hypotheses can be verified. Finally, I suggest that Wittgenstein’s conception of a hypothesis relates to his practical view of how language functions.
AB - In this paper, I explore Wittgenstein’s conception of a hypothesis as articulated in Chapters XII and XXII of ‘Philosophical Remarks’. First, I argue that in Chapter XII, Wittgenstein draws on his account of infinity to begin to challenge the view that all hypotheses can be proven by empirical evidence. I then argue that in Chapter XXII that Wittgenstein sharpens this conception of hypotheses claiming that no hypotheses can be verified. Finally, I suggest that Wittgenstein’s conception of a hypothesis relates to his practical view of how language functions.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85093645765&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - https://www.webofscience.com/wos/woscc/full-record/WOS:000582257400001
U2 - 10.1111/phin.12293
DO - 10.1111/phin.12293
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85093645765
SN - 0190-0536
VL - 44
SP - 163
EP - 188
JO - Philosophical Investigations
JF - Philosophical Investigations
IS - 2
ER -