When two-part tariffs are not enough

mixing with nonlinear pricing

Steffen Hoernig, Tommaso Valletti

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We determine explicitly the fully nonlinear equilibrium tariffs in a simple tractable model where two firms compete for consumers whose private preferences for products and quantities are correlated because they mix both goods. Contrary to the existing literature assuming uncorrelated preferences, neither full exclusivity nor two-part tariffs can arise in equilibrium. The equilibrium tariff sorts consumers through decreasing marginal prices even when goods are almost homogeneous. The market splits endogenously between one-stop and two-stop shopping customers. This conclusion also holds when consumers differ in total demand.
Original languageEnglish
Article number21
JournalThe B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
Volume11
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2011

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Keywords

  • nonlinear tariffs
  • two-part tariffs
  • exclusivity
  • common agency
  • mixing goods

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