Understanding some recent existence results for discontinuous games

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29 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We introduce a new condition, weak better-reply security, and show that every compact, locally convex, metric, quasiconcave and weakly better-reply secure game has a Nash equilibrium. This result is established using simple generalizations of classical ideas. Furthermore, we show that, when players' action spaces are metric and locally convex, it implies the existence results of Reny (Econometrica 67:1029-1056, 1999) and Carmona (J Econ Theory 144:1333-1340, 2009) and that it is equivalent to a recent result of Barelli and Soza (On the Existence of Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous and Qualitative Games, University of Rochester, Rochester, 2009). Our general existence result also implies a new existence result for weakly upper reciprocally semicontinuous and weakly payoff secure games that satisfy a strong quasiconcavity property.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)31-45
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume48
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2011

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