The Rights of Future Persons Under Attack: Correlativity in the Non-Identity Problem

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This paper aims at answering some of the objections to the NIP’s criticism of the idea of rights of future persons. Those objections usually adopt different perspectives depending on how they understand differently the nature of the correlativity between rights and duties – some adopt a present-rights-of-future-persons view, others a future-rights-of-future-persons view, others a transitive present-rights-of-present-persons view, and others still an eternalist view of rights and persons. The paper will try to show that only a non-transitive present-rights-of-present-persons view can survive the challenges posed by the notion of correlativity inherent in the NIP, and thus preserve rights language when discussing the future. This view is proved also more suitable for the legal and political realms, where policies and law-making are usually more concerned with present addressees and short term effects.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-36
Number of pages36
JournalPhilosophia (United States)
Publication statusPublished - 15 Jul 2019


  • non-identity problem
  • Rights
  • Future persons
  • correlativity
  • overlapping generations
  • semi-future


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