The politics of growth: Can lobbying raise growth and welfare?

Paulo Júlio

doi:10.1016/j.jmacro.2014.08.007

The politics of growth: Can lobbying raise growth and welfare?

Paulo Júlio

NOVA School of Business and Economics (NOVA SBE)

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider a setup where lobbyist firms undertake contributions to an office-motivated policy maker in exchange for profit increasing regulations, in a general equilibrium model of R&D-driven growth. We find that, despite increasing concentration-which leads to higher prices and less varieties-lobbying may stimulate growth and increase welfare by means of an expansion in aggregate demand if its real costs are small. This conclusion is supported by a simple calibration exercise.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	263-280
Number of pages	18
Journal	Journal of Macroeconomics
Volume	42
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2014.08.007
Publication status	Published - 1 Dec 2014

Keywords

Growth
Lobbying
Market structure
R&D investment
Welfare

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

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10.1016/j.jmacro.2014.08.007

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title = "The politics of growth: Can lobbying raise growth and welfare?",

abstract = "We consider a setup where lobbyist firms undertake contributions to an office-motivated policy maker in exchange for profit increasing regulations, in a general equilibrium model of R&D-driven growth. We find that, despite increasing concentration-which leads to higher prices and less varieties-lobbying may stimulate growth and increase welfare by means of an expansion in aggregate demand if its real costs are small. This conclusion is supported by a simple calibration exercise.",

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KW - Lobbying

KW - Market structure

KW - R&D investment

KW - Welfare

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The politics of growth: Can lobbying raise growth and welfare?

Abstract

Keywords

UN SDGs

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