The Negative Legislator: Machiavelli’s Popular Epistemocracy in the Discourses on Livy

In the Discourses on Livy, Machiavelli maintains that the people is often superior epistemically to princes. This forms the outlines of an argument from popular epistemocracy. However, in light of his theory of humours, how can governance belong to the most epistemically capable if they are driven solely by a negative desire? How can the best decisions regarding domination be made by those who only have a desire to not dominate? This paper develops the thesis that the people’s negative humours can be consistent with the claim that it has the best epistemic capacities to rule insofar as such capacities are understood only negatively, based on the people’s competencies to assess error and identify mistakes in collective decision-making. The argument is divided into three sections. The first unpacks the problem by clarifying how multiplicity in Machiavelli has more robust epistemic value and, consequentially, more political value in certain circumstances. The second explains the negative dimension of epistemic capacity and how Machiavelli attributes it to the people by highlighting two epistemically crucial characteristics: multiplicity and diversity. The third lists the people’s three forms of negative governance displayed in the Discourses: intra-institutional opposition, institutional participation (in litigation, the selection of magistrates, and lawmaking), and extra-institutional contestation. In the end, it should be clear that Machiavelli qualifies as an epistemocrat with democratic tendencies insofar as the people fulfils the role of a ‘negative legislator’.