The European Parliament in Economic Governance

Adrienne Héritier, Katharina L. Meissner, Catherine Moury, Magnus G. Schoeller

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Abstract

In this chapter, we investigate the EP’s institutional role in economic governance during the Eurozone crisis and its aftermath. The Lisbon Treaty restricts the EP’s right to co-legislation in economic governance primarily to the area of multilateral surveillance. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, however, coincided with the onset of the Eurozone crisis. Hence, we examine the extent to which the EP has been able to increase its own power in the reform of the Economic and Monetary Union. Further, we analyse under which conditions the EP succeeded and failed in expanding its powers beyond the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. We found that—contrary to conventional wisdom—the EP obtained some (in)formal institutional changes to its benefit. It did so by employing a multitude of strategies such as arena-linking or inventing and implementing new rules unilaterally (‘moving first’). However, whenever the EP’s institutional demands affected core state powers, for instance national budgetary control in the case of member state bailouts, its strategies failed.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEuropean Administrative Governance
EditorsThomas Christiansen, Sophie Vanhoonacker
Place of PublicationCham
PublisherPalgrave Macmillan
Pages113-147
Number of pages35
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-030-16777-6
ISBN (Print)978-3-030-16776-9
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019

Publication series

NameEuropean Administrative Governance
ISSN (Print)2524-7263
ISSN (Electronic)2524-7271

Keywords

  • Economic governance
  • European Parliament
  • Eurozone crisis
  • Multilateral surveillance

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'The European Parliament in Economic Governance'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this