The epistemic value of holding for true

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2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper explores the epistemological problem of holding something to be true while building on Wittgenstein's later philosophy. I claim that it was Frege's criticism of psychologism in logic that gave a boost to Wittgenstein's reflections on this issue, an issue that already occupies a central place in Kant's theory of knowledge. I shall endeavour to show that Wittgenstein's considerations on rule-following and the systematic character of belief not only make evident the shortcomings of Frege's explanation of how the mind works but also take a step forward in overcoming the flaws of Kantian epistemology. The later Wittgenstein, I argue, goes further than Kant in the recognition that truth cannot attain more objectivity than the expression of our holding for true, but this does not mean endorsing any subjectivism.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)155-170
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of philosophical research
Volume40
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015

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