Abstract
This paper analyzes the choice of the socially optimal titling system assuming rational individual choices about recording, assurance, and registration decisions. It focuses on the enforcement of property rights to land under private titling and the two existing public titling systems, recording and registration. When the reduction in the expected costs of forfeiture balances the higher cost of initial registration, a registration system is more efficient than a recording system. Implications for title assurance, land improvements, and transactions are also considered.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 709-727 |
Journal | Journal Of Law & Economics |
Volume | 48 |
Issue number | 2 |
Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2005 |
Keywords
- PROPERTY-RIGHTS
- ECONOMICS
- ANTICOMMONS
- INSURANCE
- TENURE
- VIEW
- LAW