Social norms and the paradox of elections' turnout

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

14 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

People vote although their marginal gain from voting is zero.We contribute to the resolution of this paradox by presentinga model for equilibrium configuration of attitudes regardingthe decision to vote. Each individual is seen as an element ofa social network, within which pairs of individuals expressideas and attitudes, exerting mutual influence. We model therole of such networks in propagating the mutual influenceacross pairs of individuals. We show that it may suffice thata small set of individuals have a strong feeling about showingup to vote to generate a significant turnout in elections.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)239-255
Number of pages17
JournalPublic Choice
Volume121
Issue number1-2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2004

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