Singles, couples, time-averaging, and taxation

Hans A. Holter, Lars Ljungqvist, Thomas J. Sargent, Serhiy Stepanchuk

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We study consequences of tax reforms in an incomplete markets overlapping generations model in which male and female workers with different ability levels self-insure by acquiring a risk-free bond, “time-averaging” their life-cycle work schedules and career lengths, and possibly by marrying and divorcing. We study incidences of a flat-rate tax and in combination with stylized versions of a negative income tax (NIT) or an earned income tax credit (EITC). Tax reforms have diverse effects that differ by workers’ abilities, marital statuses, and ages. A new “ex post-ex ante” criterion helps us to sort through welfare incidences. The importance of labor supply responses at the extensive margin makes the EITC better for redistribution than the NIT.

Original languageEnglish
Article number103702
JournalJournal of Monetary Economics
Volume150
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2025

Keywords

  • EITC
  • Flat-rate tax
  • Heterogeneous households
  • Labor supply
  • Negative income tax
  • Precautionary saving
  • Social security
  • Time-averaging

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