Seeking Evidence

7.1 Theoretical fragility and natural solidity of our situation—Evidence as immediate—Does it make sense to seek for a justification of evidence?—Wittgenstein and the indefeasibility of our “system of evidence”—Two kinds of doubt: their local and global epistemological effects—Certainty and security—Greco on the epistemic status of “contextually basic beliefs” in Wittgenstein’s later writings—Hinge propositions: what they are and what they are for—Idea of natural ontology—Wittgensteinian contextualism and the thereness of our evidence. 7.2 Gil on common and scientific evidence—The non-discursiveness of what presents itself to us as evident: idea of “hallucination”—Evidence as transpositional in regard to all perceptive content: the status of this primordial modality—Why evidence is groundless. 7.3 Primary and secondary evidence—Gil on assent: reminiscences of Zeno—The difficulty of invalidating the feeling of reality prompted by our acts of assent. 7.4 Gil’s effort to avoid a transcendental deduction: an evidence that does not depend on us—The phantasm of a modal categorization—Similarities between Husserl and Gil apropos of the genesis of evidence—Pritchard on “epistemic angst” and “epistemic vertigo”: the phenomenological basis of the latter—Williams’ dismissal of “knowledge-specific scepticism”: beyond the sceptical problems of typical contextualist analyses.