Abstract
This paper examines the effect of two Securities and Exchange Commission regulatory interventions related to disclosure of non-GAAP financial measures. There are three main results. First, the probability of disclosure of non-GAAP earnings declines in 2003, but the probability of disclosure of other non-GAAP financial measures has an accelerated decline after the first intervention. Second, all else equal, after Regulation G, investors have a positive market reaction to the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings. Finally, investors react to the adjustments made by I/B/E/S financial analysts as they do to the GAAP surprise, but they do not react to the additional adjustments made by firms.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 549-574 |
Number of pages | 26 |
Journal | Review of Accounting Studies |
Volume | 11 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Dec 2006 |
Keywords
- Disclosure
- Financial analysts
- Non-GAAP financial measures
- Pro forma