Retraction and Verbal Disputes

In this paper we reflect on the role of retraction in determining the verbal or non-verbal nature of disputes. Drawing on the recent philosophical discussion on the topic, we examine the difficulties in distinguishing the relevant type of retraction involved in numerous cases and, accordingly, in determining the verbal or non-verbal nature of the antecedent dispute. We advance this discussion by identifying a largely unacknowledged form of retraction—verbal retraction—and by analyzing its consequences in disagreement-driven argumentative disputes. We point out a philosophically significant, limiting case where retraction, while prima facie verbal, effectively produces clear changes at the object-level perspective and, as such, should be counted as non-verbal. Altogether, we propose a dynamic approach to disputes, which affirms their indeterminate nature (verbal or non-verbal) based on the ever-present possibility of new conversational moves retroactively redefining the nature of the original dispute. Retraction is a specimen of such a redefining move that merits further scrutiny.