TY - JOUR
T1 - Rent sharing in China
T2 - Magnitude, heterogeneity and drivers
AU - Duan, Wenjing
AU - Martins, Pedro Silva
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank comments from Pawel Bukowski, Zehua Jiang, Lawrence Katz, Laura Giuliano, Kevin Lang, Marco Manacorda, Barbara Petrongolo, Yong Yang, Yu Zhu and seminar and workshop participants at Queen Mary University of London, Society of Labor Economics, CEA conference (Shanghai), London Inequality workshop and the University of Uppsala. We also received financial support from the China Scholarship Council (grant 201706130061, Duan) and the European Union (grant VS/2016/0340, Martins). All errors are our own.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Copyright:
Copyright 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2022/3
Y1 - 2022/3
N2 - Do firms in China share rents with their workers? We address this question by examining firm-level panel data covering virtually all manufacturing firms over the period 2000–2007, representing an average of 52 million workers per year. We find evidence of rent sharing (RS), with wage–profit elasticities of between 4% and 6%. These results are based on multiple instrumental variables, including firm-specific international trade shocks. We also present a number of complementary findings to understand better the nature of RS in the country: it involves an element of risk sharing, as wages also decrease when profits fall; RS is lower in regions with more latent competition from rural workers; higher minimum wages tend to reduce RS; and, while employer labour market power reduces wages, it increases RS. Overall, despite its importance, RS in China is smaller and more symmetric than in developed economies, which reflects the weaker bargaining power of its workers and the earlier stage of development of its labour market institutions.
AB - Do firms in China share rents with their workers? We address this question by examining firm-level panel data covering virtually all manufacturing firms over the period 2000–2007, representing an average of 52 million workers per year. We find evidence of rent sharing (RS), with wage–profit elasticities of between 4% and 6%. These results are based on multiple instrumental variables, including firm-specific international trade shocks. We also present a number of complementary findings to understand better the nature of RS in the country: it involves an element of risk sharing, as wages also decrease when profits fall; RS is lower in regions with more latent competition from rural workers; higher minimum wages tend to reduce RS; and, while employer labour market power reduces wages, it increases RS. Overall, despite its importance, RS in China is smaller and more symmetric than in developed economies, which reflects the weaker bargaining power of its workers and the earlier stage of development of its labour market institutions.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85107149350&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/bjir.12609
DO - 10.1111/bjir.12609
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85107149350
SN - 0007-1080
VL - 60
SP - 176
EP - 219
JO - British Journal of Industrial Relations
JF - British Journal of Industrial Relations
IS - 1
ER -