Reality in Itself

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Abstract

4.1 Bolzano and Frege—The rejection of psychologism in logic—Can there be just “signs of signs”?—Frege’s notions of “sense”, “reference” and “representation”—Our images of things as psychological—Relativity of any representations: their problematic subjectivity. 4.2 The objectivity of Frege’s “thoughts”—Importance of context—Truth-values and verification as conditions of knowledge—True and false judgments. 4.3 Cases of “indirect reference”: truth and falsity of our beliefs—Frege on intersubjectivity—The social nature of language—The intrinsic non-truth of our thoughts—Inevitability of admitting a reality in itself that is independent from subjective perspectives—Frege’s “third realm”: objectivity as non-actual—The bankruptcy of correspondism—Popper, Dummett and Soames on the dangers of metaphysical realism or Platonism—Analytic and synthetic truths: the timelessness of both timeless and temporal thoughts—Pursuing solid epistemic standards not only for context-independent but also for context-dependent knowledge.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationDescription of Situations
Subtitle of host publicationAn Essay in Contextualist Epistemology
EditorsNuno Venturinha
Place of PublicationBerlim
PublisherSpringer
Pages27-33
Number of pages7
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-030-00154-4
ISBN (Print)978-3-030-00153-7
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018

Publication series

NameSpringerBriefs in Philosophy
ISSN (Print)2211-4548
ISSN (Electronic)2211-4556

Keywords

  • Frege
  • Intersubjectivity
  • Objectivity
  • Realism
  • Representation
  • Subjectivity

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