Presidential power and bargaining complexity in the party selection of Italian heads of state, 1948-2022

Among political scientists, presidents in parliamentary democracies have received little attention as compared to their popularly elected counterparts. Yet, there is evidence of influential heads of state beyond semi-presidential and presidential systems, and the Italian one is a case in point. Scholars agree that the ‘informal power’ of Italian presidents has grown substantially since the early 1990s, due to the combination of weak party organisations, the personalisation of politics, and the mediatisation of the presi-dency. While the literature shows that the choice of the president has become more salient for parties, hardly anything is known about the impact that the increased presidential power has on the complexity of the selection process. This article argues that, when presidents are powerful, parties face high adverse selection costs and, therefore, party leaders will be less likely to compromise on candidates. This, in turn, can lead to political stalemates. Using a novel measure of bargaining complexity, the empirical analysis supports this argument, which holds also after controlling for the contingent features of the parliamentary party set-up. The findings have implications for the study of political leaders and party beha-viour at a time of party government decline.