TY - JOUR
T1 - On games of perfect information
T2 - Equilibria, ε-equilibria and approximation by simple games
AU - Carmona, Guilherme
PY - 2005/12/1
Y1 - 2005/12/1
N2 - We show that every bounded, continuous at infinity game of perfect information has an ε-perfect equilibrium. Our method consists of approximating the payoff function of each player by a sequence of simple functions, and to consider the corresponding sequence of games, each differing from the original game only on the payoff function. In addition, this approach yields a new characterization of perfect equilibria: A strategy f is a perfect equilibrium in such a game G if and only if it is an 1/n-perfect equilibrium in Gn for all n, where {Gn} stands for our approximation sequence.
AB - We show that every bounded, continuous at infinity game of perfect information has an ε-perfect equilibrium. Our method consists of approximating the payoff function of each player by a sequence of simple functions, and to consider the corresponding sequence of games, each differing from the original game only on the payoff function. In addition, this approach yields a new characterization of perfect equilibria: A strategy f is a perfect equilibrium in such a game G if and only if it is an 1/n-perfect equilibrium in Gn for all n, where {Gn} stands for our approximation sequence.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=29144505954&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1142/S0219198905000661
DO - 10.1142/S0219198905000661
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:29144505954
SN - 0219-1989
VL - 7
SP - 491
EP - 499
JO - International Game Theory Review
JF - International Game Theory Review
IS - 4
ER -