O que é agir moralmente? Razão, Natureza e Meta-ética

The present work takes as its subject-matter what happens when we think and evaluate the world in moral terms. In the course of it, I was interested both in questions about the range of metaethics in what concerns the status of moral judgements and what place moral value has in the world, and cognitive and psychological questions about the nature of that agent capable of evaluating the world from a moral standpoint. More specifically, I sought to query how reason and nature concur to form such peculiar view on the world, and whether there are reasons to think this is an absolutely unique standpoint, non-continuous with other forms of being and acting. I was also interested in understanding to what extent the more recent attempts at naturalizing ethics have some bearing in metaethics. Though it seems to me that some metaethic questions may be illuminated once it is clarified what categorizing the world morally amounts to, there seem to be no reasons to think that from a naturalized perspective of the agent capable of perceiving value it must follow the naturalization of value itself, i.e., the strict identification between value and some purely descriptive or natural feature of the world.