Noncooperative equilibrium and chamberlinian monopolistic competition

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper addresses the existence of equilibrium for a nonatomic Bertrand game in a Chamberlinian environment. We reformulate O. Hart’s model (Rev. Econ. Stud. 52, 1985, 529-546) as a nonatomic game and show that under dispersion of tastes and continuity of the tastes density, there exists a pure-strategies ε(lunate)-equilibrium where prices exceed marginal cost. Unlike Hart’s model there is no need to impose uniformity (or even independence) on the distribution of the m-tuple of differential commodities that consumers care about. Moreover, demand curves are allowed to vary across firms and in equilibrium firms may earn profits. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: B21, D43, L13.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)335-353
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume60
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 1993

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Noncooperative equilibrium and chamberlinian monopolistic competition'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this