Mixing goods with two-part tariffs

Steffen Hoernig, Tommaso M. Valletti

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider a market where consumers mix goods offered by two firms differentiated a la Hotelling, and show how tariff structures affect consumers, profits, and location decisions. As compared to linear pricing, when firms charge two-part tariffs they make higher profits while consumers are worse off. The resulting allocation is not efficient since firms choose extreme locations and too little mixing occurs. Still, under competition in flat subscription fees only there is no mixing at all, and the outcome is Pareto-dominated by competition in the other types of tariffs. Results are discussed with a particular emphasis on the media industry. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1733-1750
JournalEuropean Economic Review
Volume51
Issue number7
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2007

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Two-part tariff
Tariffs
Profit
Charge
Media industry
Pareto
Consumer markets
Subscription
Fees
Pricing
Hotelling
Location decision

Keywords

  • two-part tariffs
  • flat fees
  • combinable products
  • media economics
  • pay-per-view

Cite this

Hoernig, Steffen ; Valletti, Tommaso M. / Mixing goods with two-part tariffs. In: European Economic Review. 2007 ; Vol. 51, No. 7. pp. 1733-1750.
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Mixing goods with two-part tariffs. / Hoernig, Steffen; Valletti, Tommaso M.

In: European Economic Review, Vol. 51, No. 7, 01.01.2007, p. 1733-1750.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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