Measuring Unilateral Effects in Partial Horizontal Acquisitions

Duarte Miguel Machado Carneiro de Brito, Ricardo Ribeiro, Helder Vasconcelos

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Recent years have witnessed an increased interest, by competition agencies, in assessing the competitive effects of partial acquisitions. We propose an empirical structural methodology to examine quantitatively the unilateral impact of partial horizontal acquisitions. The acquisitions may be direct or indirect, and may or may not correspond to control. The proposed methodology simulates the effects on prices, market shares, firm profits and consumer welfare. It can deal with differentiated product industries and nest full mergers as a special case. We provide an empirical application to several acquisitions in the wet shaving industry.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)22-36
JournalInternational Journal of Industrial Organization
Volume33
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2014

Keywords

  • Antitrust
  • Demand estimation
  • Differentiated products
  • Oligopoly
  • Partial acquisitions
  • Unilateral effects

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