Manipulation-proof equilibrium in atomless economies with commodity differentiation

Carlos Hervés-Beloso, Emma Moreno-García, Mário Rui Páscoa

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce a perfect competition test which checks the incentives of arbitrarily small coalitions to behave strategically in endowments and preferences. We apply this coalitional incentive compatibility test to atomless economies with a continuum of differentiated commodities. We show that, under thickness conditions, economies with a finite number of types and economies whose set of agents' preferences is compact, pass this perfect competition test. Limiting results for replica economies are also presented.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)545-563
Number of pages19
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume14
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 1999

Keywords

  • Continuum economies
  • Incentive compatibility
  • Perfect competition
  • Thick markets
  • Walrasian equilibrium

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