Abstract
Baruch Spinoza's revolution in the realm of individuality does not simply transform the way subjective natural rights should be regarded. Spinoza makes clear in his definitions concerning natural law that they are mostly laws of nature, even though developed exclusively in individuality. These laws of Nature are not usually attributed to the natural rights tradition as their elements, since they are usually regarded as objective rather than subjective aspects. Spinoza shares with the traditional view on laws the perception that a prescription is normative only when it expresses a certain measure of demand, that is, when it is imperative. Traditional natural laws in the prescriptive sense are for Spinoza simply artifices induced by human passions and made by the human imagination in order to cover a lack of knowledge susceptible of causing insecurity and despair. Natural laws in Spinoza's natural law theory must be something expressing the original and continuous cause of itself in the realm of existent individuals.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Spinoza and Law |
Editors | Andre Santos Campos |
Place of Publication | London |
Publisher | Routledge |
Chapter | 12 |
Pages | 207-248 |
Number of pages | 42 |
Edition | 1st |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781315087757 |
ISBN (Print) | 9781351548052 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 5 Jul 2017 |