Large games with countable characteristics

Guilherme Carmona

doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.05.011

Large games with countable characteristics

Guilherme Carmona

NOVA School of Business and Economics (NOVA SBE)

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider anonymous games with an atomless probability space of players in which players' characteristics are countable. Our main result shows that the set of equilibrium distributions coincides with the set of distributions induced by equilibrium strategies together with the function assigning characteristics to players. This result implies the existence of Nash equilibria in continuous large games with countable characteristics. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	344-347
Journal	Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume	44
Issue number	3-4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.05.011
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2008

Keywords

Nash equilibrium
games with a continuum of players
equilibrium distributions

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10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.05.011

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abstract = "We consider anonymous games with an atomless probability space of players in which players' characteristics are countable. Our main result shows that the set of equilibrium distributions coincides with the set of distributions induced by equilibrium strategies together with the function assigning characteristics to players. This result implies the existence of Nash equilibria in continuous large games with countable characteristics. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.",

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AB - We consider anonymous games with an atomless probability space of players in which players' characteristics are countable. Our main result shows that the set of equilibrium distributions coincides with the set of distributions induced by equilibrium strategies together with the function assigning characteristics to players. This result implies the existence of Nash equilibria in continuous large games with countable characteristics. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

KW - Nash equilibrium

KW - games with a continuum of players

KW - equilibrium distributions

U2 - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.05.011

DO - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.05.011

M3 - Article

SN - 0304-4068

VL - 44

SP - 344

EP - 347

JO - Journal of Mathematical Economics

JF - Journal of Mathematical Economics

IS - 3-4

ER -

Large games with countable characteristics

Abstract

Keywords

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