La Filosofía Leibniziana de la Subjectividad

Leibniz works out an original philosophy of the subjectivity, which is formed in confrontation with the Cartesian cogito, alongside the authors who assume Descartes’s legacy, namely the influential Arnauld. For Leibniz, the proposition “I think” is certain and evident, however it is not a universal truth of reason, that could be assumed as the very foundation of all knowledge. It is a truth of fact, to which corresponds an insurmountably confuse experience, that appeals to a special way of intelligibility. Within such framework, Leibniz delineates a grammar of the I, viewed as a relational structure, a singular expression of our common world.
In the Leibnizian philosophical exercise, which culminates in the monadological system, the subjectivity is interpreted as the subconscious spontaneous dynamism, at the level of a primordial Self. Therefore, consciousness is the highest expression of the perceptive dynamism, but it is not the primary stratum of perception, through which the identity of the percipient subject is assured.