Abstract
In this paper I want to argue against Johnson’s view that informal logic is not applied epistemology. I propose a complex scheme of argument evaluations that
combines evaluation of the logical product with evaluation of the arguer’s
performance, and show that these evaluations and the norms they invoke can
be expressed analogously in epistemological terms or in terms of rational persuasion. My conclusion is that it makes very little difference which we see them as. This leads to the real point of the paper: the idea that we must decide first how to define argumentation before developing a theory of evaluation is mistaken. We can simply look at the kind of evaluations that we in fact make.
combines evaluation of the logical product with evaluation of the arguer’s
performance, and show that these evaluations and the norms they invoke can
be expressed analogously in epistemological terms or in terms of rational persuasion. My conclusion is that it makes very little difference which we see them as. This leads to the real point of the paper: the idea that we must decide first how to define argumentation before developing a theory of evaluation is mistaken. We can simply look at the kind of evaluations that we in fact make.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1-23 |
| Number of pages | 24 |
| Journal | Revista Iberoamericana de Argumentación |
| Volume | 11 |
| Publication status | Published - 2015 |
Keywords
- Argument evaluation, applied epistemology, manifest rationality, informal logic, Ralph Johnson