Interfirm Bundling and Vertical Product Differentiation

Duarte Brito, Helder Vasconcelos

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

15 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, we study the competitive effects of bundled discounts offered by pairs of independent firms. In a setting with vertically differentiated goods, where firms decide whether to participate in a discounting scheme before prices are set, it is shown that, in equilibrium, all pairs of firms producing goods of the same quality level offer bundled discounts. Relative to the no-bundling benchmark, we find that (i) all headline prices rise, (ii) all bundle prices, net of the respective discount, decrease, and (iii) only high-quality sellers will obtain higher profits. Furthermore, this equilibrium corresponds to the worst scenario in terms of consumer welfare, and it and decreases social welfare.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-27
Number of pages27
JournalScandinavian Journal Of Economics
Volume117
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2015

Keywords

  • Bilateral bundling
  • Bundled discounts
  • D43
  • L13
  • L41
  • Vertical differentiation

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