Individuals make commitments towards others in order to influence others to behave in certain ways. Most commitments may depend on some incentive that is required to ensure that the action is in the agent’s best interest and thus, should be carried out to avoid eventual penalties. Similarly, individuals may ground their decision on an accurate assessment of the intentions of others. Hence, both commitments and intention recognition go side by side in behavioral evolution. Here, we analyze the role played by the co-evolution of intention recognition plus the emergence of commitments, in the framework of the evolution of cooperative behavior. We resort to tools of evolutionary game theory in finite populations, showing how the combination of these two aspects of human behavior can enhance the emergent fraction of cooperative acts under a broad spectrum of configurations.
|Title of host publication||IEEE World Congress on Computational Intelligence|
|Publication status||Published - 1 Jan 2012|
|Event||2012 IEEE World Congress on Computational Intelligence (IEEE WCCI 2012) - |
Duration: 1 Jan 2012 → …
|Conference||2012 IEEE World Congress on Computational Intelligence (IEEE WCCI 2012)|
|Period||1/01/12 → …|