Inequality and stability

António Pinto Barbosa; Boyan Jovanovic; Mark M. Spiegel

doi:10.2307/20076095

Inequality and stability

António Pinto Barbosa, Boyan Jovanovic, Mark M. Spiegel

NOVA School of Business and Economics (NOVA SBE)

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

A constitution remains in force so long as no party wishes to defect to the noncooperative situation, and it is reinstituted as soon as each party finds it to its advantage to revert to cooperation. It is the rich, and not the poor segments of society who in our model pose the greater threat to the stability of the social order.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	15-40
Journal	Annales d'Économie et de Statistique
Issue number	48
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.2307/20076095 https://doi.org/10.2307/20076095
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 1997

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title = "Inequality and stability",

abstract = "A constitution remains in force so long as no party wishes to defect to the noncooperative situation, and it is reinstituted as soon as each party finds it to its advantage to revert to cooperation. It is the rich, and not the poor segments of society who in our model pose the greater threat to the stability of the social order. ",

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AB - A constitution remains in force so long as no party wishes to defect to the noncooperative situation, and it is reinstituted as soon as each party finds it to its advantage to revert to cooperation. It is the rich, and not the poor segments of society who in our model pose the greater threat to the stability of the social order.

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Inequality and stability

Abstract

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