Geographic access markets and investments

Marc Bourreau, Carlo Cambini, Steffen Hoernig

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We analyze the adoption of access regimes that differ according to the prevailing degree of infrastructure competition in different geographical areas of a country. Our results show that, compared to a uniform access price, geographically differentiated access prices improve welfare and incentivize investment. However, when access provision in areas with infrastructure competition is deregulated, welfare might decrease, because multiple inefficient equilibria at the wholesale level emerge, with either too little or too much investment.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)13-21
Number of pages9
JournalInformation Economics and Policy
Volume31
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2015

Keywords

  • Geographical access regulation
  • Infrastructure investment
  • Wholesale competition

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