Geographic access markets and investments

Marc Bourreau, Carlo Cambini, Steffen Hoernig

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

13 Citations (Scopus)


We analyze the adoption of access regimes that differ according to the prevailing degree of infrastructure competition in different geographical areas of a country. Our results show that, compared to a uniform access price, geographically differentiated access prices improve welfare and incentivize investment. However, when access provision in areas with infrastructure competition is deregulated, welfare might decrease, because multiple inefficient equilibria at the wholesale level emerge, with either too little or too much investment.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)13-21
Number of pages9
JournalInformation Economics and Policy
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2015


  • Geographical access regulation
  • Infrastructure investment
  • Wholesale competition


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