Further notes on information, corruption, and optimal law enforcement

Nuno Garoupa, Mohamed Jellal

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider two important notes on optimal law enforcement with corruption. First, we analyze the role of asymmetric information on the emergence of collusion between criminals and enforcers. Second, our paper proposes that the optimal criminal sanction for the underlying offense is not necessarily maximal. We achieve this result by coupling the criminal sanction for the underlying offense with a criminal sanction for corruption, both imposed on offenders. A higher criminal sanction for the underlying offense implies that the government must spend more resources to detect and punish corruption (since the likelihood of collusion increases). Thus, the government could reduce this sanction, save on detection, and increase the criminal sanction for corruption (in order to offset the negative effect on deterrence).

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)59-69
Number of pages11
JournalEuropean Journal Of Law And Economics
Volume23
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Feb 2007

Keywords

  • Corruption
  • Fine
  • Information
  • Probability of detection and punishment

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