Friendly investing and information sharing in the asset management industry

Benjamin Golez, Antonino Emanuele Rizzo, Rafael Zambrana

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Do asset managers engage in friendly investing to obtain privileged investment information? We test this hypothesis in the context of mutual fund connections to financial groups. Using brokers as the source of connections, we find that funds overweight the stock of connected financial groups and side with management in contested votes. We also find that fund performance improves with the extent of friendly investing. The improvement stems from trading the stock of companies that borrow from connected financial groups. Brokerage commissions do not drive the results. Our findings suggest that funds can obtain valuable information by acting as friendly shareholders.

Original languageEnglish
JournalJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
DOIs
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 2023

Keywords

  • Asset management
  • brokerage firms
  • business ties
  • financial conglomerates
  • financial stability
  • mutual funds
  • price support

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