Fiscal conservatism in a new democracy: "sophisticated" versus "naïve" voters

Paulo Roberto Arvate, George Avelino, José Tavares

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

19 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We use data from gubernatorial elections in Brazil to test the electoral reactions of "sophisticated" and "naïve" voters to fiscal surpluses. Our results complement Brender and Drazen [Brender, Adi, and Drazen, A., (2005b), "How do budget deficits and economic growth affect reelection prospects? Evidence from a large cross-section of countries", NBER Working Paper 11862, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts]: we find no evidence of fiscal illusion while, in some cases, a fiscal surplus may actually increase the probability of reelection.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)125-127
Number of pages3
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume102
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Feb 2009

Keywords

  • Budget deficits
  • Elections
  • Fiscal conservatism
  • Political cycles

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Fiscal conservatism in a new democracy: "sophisticated" versus "naïve" voters'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this