Ex-post stability of Bayes-Nash equilibria of large games

Guilherme Carmona, Konrad Podczeck

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Citations (Scopus)


We present a result on approximate ex-post stability of Bayes-Nash equilibria in semi-anonymous Bayesian games with a large finite number of players. The result allows players' action and type spaces to be general compact metric spaces, thus extending a result by Kalai (2004).

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)418-430
Number of pages13
JournalGames And Economic Behavior
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2012


  • Bayes-Nash equilibrium
  • Concentration
  • Ex-post stability
  • Large games

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