Abstract
Este artigo estuda um aspeto da relação entre emoções e ética que é geralmente negli-genciado no recente debate sobre emoções morais. Ao focar o contributo das emoções comuns ou quotidianas para o desenvolvimento de comportamentos ou atitudes morais, tal debate perde de vista o lado emocional da própria atitude ética e a forma como ela envolve emoções diferentes, especificamente éticas. Em contraste, tais emoções desempenham um papel importante no pensamento de Aristóteles e Heidegger. Como se mostrará, am-bos identificam emoções que estão intrinsecamente ligadas à ética em sentido lato e são estruturalmente diferentes das emoções quotidianas. Além disso, ambos caracterizam os dois tipos de emoção de forma semelhante: enquanto as emoções quotidianas envolvem uma forma limitada de atividade e se referem a um domínio objetivo mais imediato, as emoções propriamente éticas resultam de uma forma superior de atividade e abrem para um domínio mais vasto ou até mesmo para realidade no seu todo, tendo assim um carácter metafísico. O estudo desta distinção e do que está implicado nela permitirá compreender melhor não só as emoções em geral, mas também a dimensão emocional da vida ética.
This article studies an aspect of the relation between emotions and ethics that is usually neglected in the recent debate on moral emotions. By focusing on the contributions of common or everyday emotions to the development of moral behaviours and attitudes, the debate loses sight of the emotional side of the ethical attitude and the way it involves different, specifically ethical emotions. In contrast, such emotions play an important role in Aristotle's and Heidegger's thought. As will be shown, both authors identify emotions that are intrinsically tied to ethics in a broad sense and are structurally different from everyday emotions. Moreover, both characterize the two kinds of emotion in a similar fashion: whereas everyday emotions involve a limited form of activity and refer to a more immediate objective domain, the properly ethical emotions result from a superior form of activity and open up to a vaster domain or even to the entire reality, thus having a metaphysical character. The study of this distinction and what it involves will allow for a better understanding not only of emotions in general, but also of the emotional dimension of ethical life.
This article studies an aspect of the relation between emotions and ethics that is usually neglected in the recent debate on moral emotions. By focusing on the contributions of common or everyday emotions to the development of moral behaviours and attitudes, the debate loses sight of the emotional side of the ethical attitude and the way it involves different, specifically ethical emotions. In contrast, such emotions play an important role in Aristotle's and Heidegger's thought. As will be shown, both authors identify emotions that are intrinsically tied to ethics in a broad sense and are structurally different from everyday emotions. Moreover, both characterize the two kinds of emotion in a similar fashion: whereas everyday emotions involve a limited form of activity and refer to a more immediate objective domain, the properly ethical emotions result from a superior form of activity and open up to a vaster domain or even to the entire reality, thus having a metaphysical character. The study of this distinction and what it involves will allow for a better understanding not only of emotions in general, but also of the emotional dimension of ethical life.
Translated title of the contribution | Everyday emotions and ethical emotions in Aristotle and Heidegger |
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Original language | Portuguese |
Pages (from-to) | 218-227 |
Number of pages | 10 |
Journal | Filosofia Unisinos |
Volume | 21 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2020 |
Keywords
- affection
- mood
- virtue
- authenticity
- metaphysics