Abstract
En los textos introductorios a la Teodicea, Leibniz polemiza con Pierre Bayle acerca de los límites de la razón humana. En el Prefacio le acusa de querer «imponer silencio a la razón después de haber hecho que hablara demasiado». En el Discurso Preliminar expone detalladamente las razones que le llevan a acusar a Bayle de cometer este doble abuso y las contrasta con su propio planteamiento. En el centro de la argumentación está el diverso modo de entender la distinción entre «lo que está por encima de la razón» y lo que es «contra la razón». El artículo analiza la crítica de Leibniz y su desenlace: Bayle es acusado de incoherencia y de ocultar su dogmatismo bajo la capa de una actitud crítica y Leibniz propone que se substituya el, a su entender ilusorio, «triunfo de la fe sobre la razón» de Bayle por una forma singular de triunfo de la fe «en nombre de la razón», que así se cons-tituye en único «juez de las controversias».
In the introductory texts to Theodicy, Leibniz argues with Pierre Bayle about the limits ofhuman reason. In the Preface, Leibniz accuses Bayle of wanting to ‘silence reason after havingmade it talk too much’. In the Preliminary Discourse, he explains in detail the reasons that led him to accuse Bayle of committing this double abuse and contrasts them with hisown approach. At the centre of the argument is the different way of understanding the distinction between what is ‘above reason’ and what is ‘against reason’. This article analysesLeibniz’s critique and its denouement: Bayle is accused of incoherence and of hiding hisdogmatism under the layer of a critical attitude and Leibniz proposes to substitute, whatis in his illusory view, Bayle’s ‘triumph of faith over reason’ for a singular form of triumphof faith ‘in the name of reason’, which thus becomes the sole ‘judge of controversies’.
In the introductory texts to Theodicy, Leibniz argues with Pierre Bayle about the limits ofhuman reason. In the Preface, Leibniz accuses Bayle of wanting to ‘silence reason after havingmade it talk too much’. In the Preliminary Discourse, he explains in detail the reasons that led him to accuse Bayle of committing this double abuse and contrasts them with hisown approach. At the centre of the argument is the different way of understanding the distinction between what is ‘above reason’ and what is ‘against reason’. This article analysesLeibniz’s critique and its denouement: Bayle is accused of incoherence and of hiding hisdogmatism under the layer of a critical attitude and Leibniz proposes to substitute, whatis in his illusory view, Bayle’s ‘triumph of faith over reason’ for a singular form of triumphof faith ‘in the name of reason’, which thus becomes the sole ‘judge of controversies’.
Original language | Spanish |
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Pages (from-to) | 91-119 |
Number of pages | 29 |
Journal | Enrahonar. An International Journal of Theoretical and Practical Reason |
Volume | 59 |
Publication status | Published - 2017 |
Keywords
- apariencia
- error
- experiencia
- fe
- ilusión
- lógica de lo contingente
- verdades de hecho
- verdades de razón
- verosimilitud
- appearance
- experience
- faith
- illusion
- logic of the contingent
- truths of fact
- truths of reason
- verisimilitude