Die Idee des Schaminstinkts in Kants anthropologischen Schriften

Translated title of the contribution: The idea of shame instinct in Kant's anthropological writings

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)


This paper corrects a historical injustice that has been perpetrated against Kant for some time now. Mostly on good grounds, Kantian ethics have been accused of neglecting the role played by the emotions in moral deliberation and in morally informed action. However, the contemporary moral philosophers who have put forth such a claim tend to bypass textual sources, on the one hand, and to downplay the role played by the anthropological writings on Kant's practical philosophy as a whole, on the other. Relying on highly relevant pre-critical texts in which Kant sketches future argumentative patterns and discusses the role of negative emotions like shame on the improvement of the human species, I address a mistaken conclusion about Kantian ethics as a whole that is common in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. Finally, I raise some paradoxical conclusions that follow from Kant's argument, once its implicit premises have been brought to light.
Translated title of the contributionThe idea of shame instinct in Kant's anthropological writings
Original languageGerman
Pages (from-to)383-402
Number of pages20
JournalDeutsche Zeitschrift fur Philosophie
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2021


  • Bernard Williams
  • Lectures on Ethics
  • Sexual impulse
  • Shame and Necessity
  • Shame instinct
  • State of nature


Dive into the research topics of 'The idea of shame instinct in Kant's anthropological writings'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this