Determinism and Possible Worlds

6.1 There is an apparent freedom of the will—Our actions presuppose free decisions—Is there a natural necessity in the world?—Feldman’s rejection of a contextualist solution to the problem of free will: determinism and scepticism—Wright on even-handedness and factivity—Contextualism at work: Lewis’ infallibilist view and Williams’ concerns. 6.2 Aristotle’s structural account of the actualization of potentialities in contrast with Aquinas’ totalitarianism of the “divine intellect”—Is creativity at risk?—Our making in general as necessitated. 6.3 The question of possible worlds: Lewis’ modal realism—What does it mean for a possibility to be unactualized?—The lack of a hierarchy of importance among possibilia—Idea of interdependency of choices—Does it make sense to talk about alternatives to the actual world?—Infinite variations comprise both infinite actions and infinite reactions—Inoperability of a unique source of causation—The need for the right multiplicity, which nevertheless results in an abstract possibility.