Defining Delusion in the DSM-5

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Abstract

The definition of delusion presented in the most recent version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) raises several interesting philosophical questions. In the 2013 edition, a delusion is said to be “a false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly held despite what almost everyone else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary. The belief is not ordinarily accepted by other members of the person’s culture or subculture (i.e., it is not an article of religious faith)” (APA, 2013: 819). From a practical point of view, disagreements about how to define delusion are unlikely to be all that problematic; if psychiatry is to be a complete science, however, the theoretical aspect is very important, and having a clear definition of the phenomenon is essential. The main objective of this chapter is to outline and address three types of objections to the thesis that delusions are beliefs: the phenomenological objection, which claims that delusions are experiences; the neuroscientific objection, which devalues the question of whether delusions are beliefs; and the objection that delusions are acceptances and not beliefs. Against these objections, this chapter argues that viewing delusions as beliefs is the best available option, in both theoretical and practical terms.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Philosophy and Psychology of Delusions
Subtitle of host publicationHistorical and Contemporary Perspectives
EditorsAna Falcato, Jorge Gonçalves
PublisherTaylor & Francis
Pages177-193
Number of pages17
ISBN (Electronic)9781000916300
ISBN (Print)9781032265919
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2023

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