Corporate boards and SEOs: The effect of certification and monitoring

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In a sample of underwritten seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), issuers with boards dominated by independent directors experience higher abnormal announcement returns than issuers with boards dominated by insiders. Firm size, transparency, and other governance characteristics do not explain the effect of board independence. The positive relation between board independence and SEO returns is more pronounced for firms with lower monitoring costs and more severe financial constraints. The evidence suggests that independent directors have a positive effect because of their role in controlling both shareholder-manager conflicts (monitoring the use of funds) and current-new shareholder conflicts (certification of the issue's value).

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)899-927
Number of pages29
JournalJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Volume51
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2016

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