Cooperação e competição na Zona Euro: o futuro das reformas da governança económica da União Europeia

Notoriously, the fiscal architecture of the common currency was flawed in several respects from the very start. Less well known are the flaws in the political architecture of the Economic and Monetary Union. This is characterised by a system of incentives that thwarts all efforts towards an overall macro-economic stabilisation of the Eurozone. There are two possible solutions to this problem: one is the political union, to be brought about by means of an additional transfer of eco-nomic and fiscal sovereignty and a corresponding mechanism of political legitimacy, or different fiscal rules within the current structure of political governance. The essay expounds upon these two options while taking into account the European Commission’s most recent reform proposals. It furthermore assesses the hurdles that the latter will have to overcome against the background of the preferences of the most influential Member States.