TY - JOUR
T1 - Conclusions
T2 - Great Recession, Great Cooperation?
AU - De Giorgi, Elisabetta
AU - Moury, Catherine
N1 - Financiamento: UID/CPO/04627/2013, SFRH/BPD/78955/2011.
PY - 2015/1/2
Y1 - 2015/1/2
N2 - Contributions to this study clearly support our initial hypotheses. It is observed, as expected, that the economic crisis has considerably decreased consensual behaviour in parliament. However, the nature of parties constitutes a crucial variable in order to explain the conduct of the opposition in the legislative arena better: since the outbreak of the crisis, radical parties have turned even more adversarial than before; whereas mainstream parties – who want to appear as a credible alternative to the government in office – have drifted towards more cooperative behaviour. Given the growing influence of the European Union on the legislation approved in response to the crisis, it was also expected (and demonstrated) that the traditionally pro-European parties would be more likely to cooperate on socio-economic issues than Eurosceptic parties. Finally, it has also been shown that timing also plays an important role in the opposition's decision either to support or to oppose the government: with opposition parties more inclined to contest the government's proposals when their chances of getting into power are higher, and vice versa.
AB - Contributions to this study clearly support our initial hypotheses. It is observed, as expected, that the economic crisis has considerably decreased consensual behaviour in parliament. However, the nature of parties constitutes a crucial variable in order to explain the conduct of the opposition in the legislative arena better: since the outbreak of the crisis, radical parties have turned even more adversarial than before; whereas mainstream parties – who want to appear as a credible alternative to the government in office – have drifted towards more cooperative behaviour. Given the growing influence of the European Union on the legislation approved in response to the crisis, it was also expected (and demonstrated) that the traditionally pro-European parties would be more likely to cooperate on socio-economic issues than Eurosceptic parties. Finally, it has also been shown that timing also plays an important role in the opposition's decision either to support or to oppose the government: with opposition parties more inclined to contest the government's proposals when their chances of getting into power are higher, and vice versa.
KW - economic crisis
KW - parliamentary opposition
KW - political parties
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85027949147&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.1080/13572334.2014.939560
DO - 10.1080/13572334.2014.939560
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85027949147
SN - 1357-2334
VL - 21
SP - 115
EP - 120
JO - Journal of Legislative Studies
JF - Journal of Legislative Studies
IS - 1
ER -