Abstract
We consider asymmetric Bertrand games with arbitrary payoffs at ties or sharing rules, and identify sufficient conditions for the zero-profit outcome and the existence of Nash equilibria. Subject to some technical conditions on non- tied payoffs the following hold. If the sharing rule is strictly tie-decreasing all players but one receive zero equilibrium payoffs, while everybody does so if non- tied payoffs are symmetric. Mixed (pure) strategy Nash equilibria exist if the sharing rule is (norm) tie-decreasing and coalition-monotone.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 573-585 |
Journal | Economic Theory |
Volume | 31 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2007 |
Keywords
- Bertrand games
- sharing rule
- tie-decreasing sharing rule
- coalition monotonicity