Bertrand games and sharing rules

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

17 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider asymmetric Bertrand games with arbitrary payoffs at ties or sharing rules, and identify sufficient conditions for the zero-profit outcome and the existence of Nash equilibria. Subject to some technical conditions on non- tied payoffs the following hold. If the sharing rule is strictly tie-decreasing all players but one receive zero equilibrium payoffs, while everybody does so if non- tied payoffs are symmetric. Mixed (pure) strategy Nash equilibria exist if the sharing rule is (norm) tie-decreasing and coalition-monotone.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)573-585
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume31
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2007

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Sharing rule
Nash equilibrium
Profit
Pure strategy Nash equilibrium

Keywords

  • Bertrand games
  • sharing rule
  • tie-decreasing sharing rule
  • coalition monotonicity

Cite this

Hoernig, Steffen. / Bertrand games and sharing rules. In: Economic Theory. 2007 ; Vol. 31, No. 3. pp. 573-585.
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Bertrand games and sharing rules. / Hoernig, Steffen.

In: Economic Theory, Vol. 31, No. 3, 01.01.2007, p. 573-585.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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