Arguing a Contrario

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Abstract

This chapter offers a new account of arguments a contrario. It is divided into six sections. Section 1 presents the argument a contrario as it is commonly seen by legal practitioners and theorists. Practitioners and theorists diverge in how they see it: while the former think of the argument as a ‘product of logic and common sense,’ the latter view it with suspicion. Section 2 explains why: according to the standard theoretical account, the argument a contrario boils down to a logical fallacy. But there are reasons, Section 3 suggests, to resist the standard account. Section 4 shows where the standard account goes wrong. Sections 5 and 6 give a new account of arguments a contrario.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationNew Conversations in Philosophy, Law, and Politics
EditorsRuth Chang, Amia Srinivasan
PublisherOxford University Press
Pages549-579
ISBN (Electronic)9780191896590
ISBN (Print)9780198864523
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2024

Keywords

  • arguments a contrario
  • arguments e contrario
  • arguments e silentio
  • expressio unius
  • justification of judicial decisions
  • law and logic
  • law application
  • legal argumentation
  • legal reasoning
  • legal syllogism

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