Abstract
This chapter offers a new account of arguments a contrario. It is divided into six sections. Section 1 presents the argument a contrario as it is commonly seen by legal practitioners and theorists. Practitioners and theorists diverge in how they see it: while the former think of the argument as a ‘product of logic and common sense,’ the latter view it with suspicion. Section 2 explains why: according to the standard theoretical account, the argument a contrario boils down to a logical fallacy. But there are reasons, Section 3 suggests, to resist the standard account. Section 4 shows where the standard account goes wrong. Sections 5 and 6 give a new account of arguments a contrario.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Title of host publication | New Conversations in Philosophy, Law, and Politics |
Editors | Ruth Chang, Amia Srinivasan |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 549-579 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9780191896590 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780198864523 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2024 |
Keywords
- arguments a contrario
- arguments e contrario
- arguments e silentio
- expressio unius
- justification of judicial decisions
- law and logic
- law application
- legal argumentation
- legal reasoning
- legal syllogism