Reasoning about security properties involves reasoning about where the information of a system is located, and how it evolves over time. While most security analysis techniques need to cope with some notions of information locality and knowledge propagation, usually they do not provide a general language for expressing arbitrary properties involving local knowledge and knowledge transfer. Building on this observation, we introduce a framework for security protocol analysis based on dynamic spatial logic specifications. Our computational model is a variant of existing pi-calculi, while specifications are expressed in a dynamic spatial logic extended with an epistemic operator. We present the syntax and semantics of the model and logic, and discuss the expressiveness of the approach, showing it complete for passive attackers. We also prove that generic Dolev-Yao attackers may be mechanically determined for any deterministic finite protocol, and discuss how this result may be used to reason about security properties of open systems. We also present a model-checking algorithm for our logic, which has been implemented as an extension to the SLMC system.
|Title of host publication||Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science|
|Publication status||Published - 30 Aug 2010|
|Event||International Workshop on Security Issues in Concurrency (SecCo) - |
Duration: 1 Jan 2010 → …
|Conference||International Workshop on Security Issues in Concurrency (SecCo)|
|Period||1/01/10 → …|