A note on optimal law enforcement under asymmetric information

Nuno Garoupa; Mohamed Jellal

doi:10.1023/A:1015677632233

A note on optimal law enforcement under asymmetric information

Nuno Garoupa, Mohamed Jellal

NOVA School of Business and Economics (NOVA SBE)

Research output: Contribution to journal › Review article › peer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We show that the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced in a framework with asymmetric information, leading to more offenses being committed. A positive correlation between crime and asymmetry of information in the enforcement process is established. Some suggestions concerning the efficiency of private versus public enforcement are drawn.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	5-13
Number of pages	9
Journal	European Journal Of Law And Economics
Volume	14
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015677632233
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2002

Keywords

Asymmetry of information
Fine
Probability of detection

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

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10.1023/A:1015677632233

Cite this

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A note on optimal law enforcement under asymmetric information

Abstract

Keywords

UN SDGs

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