A note on optimal law enforcement under asymmetric information

Nuno Garoupa, Mohamed Jellal

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)


We show that the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced in a framework with asymmetric information, leading to more offenses being committed. A positive correlation between crime and asymmetry of information in the enforcement process is established. Some suggestions concerning the efficiency of private versus public enforcement are drawn.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)5-13
Number of pages9
JournalEuropean Journal Of Law And Economics
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2002


  • Asymmetry of information
  • Fine
  • Probability of detection


Dive into the research topics of 'A note on optimal law enforcement under asymmetric information'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this