TY - JOUR
T1 - A New Role for the European Stability Mechanism in Post-COVID-19 EMU?
T2 - Explaining the Failure of the Pandemic Crisis Support and Assessing Ways Forward
AU - De Angelis, Gabriele
N1 - info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/FCT/6817 - DCRRNI ID/UIDB%2F00183%2F2020/PT#
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/FCT/6817 - DCRRNI ID/UIDP%2F00183%2F2020/PT#
UIDB/00183/2020
UIDP/00183/2020
PY - 2022
Y1 - 2022
N2 - Since the establishment of the Pandemic Crisis Support, it has been hypothesized that the European Stability Mechanism might play a new role in stabilizing investments in the European Economic and Monetary Union through a targeted support for the financing of European public goods. The article inquires into the changes in the European Stability Mechanism’s institutional design that could make this possible. It starts by analyzing its lending policy, its accountability structure, and the structure of incentives that underlie negotiations at the Board of Governors. The art- icle then explains the failure of the Pandemic Crisis Support against the background of a neo-institutionalist analysis of the two-level games that develop at intergovernmental fora, and does so through an investigation of the 2020 negotiations that led to the institution of the Pandemic Crisis Support, first, and the The Next Generation EU, later on. Finally, it illus- trates which alterations in the institutional design of the European Stability Mechanism could represent a different, and more favorable, structure of incentives for lenders and borrowers.
AB - Since the establishment of the Pandemic Crisis Support, it has been hypothesized that the European Stability Mechanism might play a new role in stabilizing investments in the European Economic and Monetary Union through a targeted support for the financing of European public goods. The article inquires into the changes in the European Stability Mechanism’s institutional design that could make this possible. It starts by analyzing its lending policy, its accountability structure, and the structure of incentives that underlie negotiations at the Board of Governors. The art- icle then explains the failure of the Pandemic Crisis Support against the background of a neo-institutionalist analysis of the two-level games that develop at intergovernmental fora, and does so through an investigation of the 2020 negotiations that led to the institution of the Pandemic Crisis Support, first, and the The Next Generation EU, later on. Finally, it illus- trates which alterations in the institutional design of the European Stability Mechanism could represent a different, and more favorable, structure of incentives for lenders and borrowers.
KW - COVID-19
KW - Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union
KW - European Stability Mechanism
KW - Intergovernmentalism
KW - Post-pandemic recovery
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85129903568&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - https://doi.org/10.1080/08911916.2022.2048551
DO - https://doi.org/10.1080/08911916.2022.2048551
M3 - Article
VL - 51
SP - 18
EP - 32
JO - International journal of political economy
JF - International journal of political economy
IS - 1
ER -